Moving along the State-Anarchy Continuum
Consider the characteristic Hobbesian argument for the state: we need Leviathan to ensure, through the use or threat of force, that conflicts are resolved peacefully. (I do not say “justly”—there is no structural way to ensure that the outcomes of any state-based judicial system [or any comparable system in a stateless society] will be procedurally or substantively just, though of course some structures will be more conducive to just procedures and outcomes than others.)
I. It is important to note how little this argument even seeks, on its own terms, to demonstrate: if it succeeds, it shows the need, at most, for a “night-watchman” or “night-guard” state.
II. It has limited implications for the size of the state. Again, assuming the argument were correct, there would obviously be some such limitations: the population governed by Leviathan would have to be sufficiently large that
IV. Nothing about the basic functions of Leviathan precludes free departure from any of these MNGSs (presuming agreements across borders ensure that courts’ judgments could still be enforced against people who fleeing to avoid the enforcement of such judgments).
V. There would be no Hobbesian reason for general limitations on anyone's entry into any of these MNGSs, with the exception of someone with a history of violence that suggested that the MNGS would have more trouble keeping the peace were she to enter (and, even here, entry need not be precluded for a potentially violent person willing to post an appropriate bond).
VI. There would, again, be no strong Hobbesian reason for any MNGS to compel payment for its services by any resident. It could simply decline to provide direct protection via its police and judicial services for anyone who declined to contribute appropriately to support for these services. Of course, some people would reap positive externalities in this case, but it seems unlikely that most would because most would want personal access to police and judicial services.
VII. Finally, it is not clear that there would be a strong Hobbesian reason for an MNGS to be geographically localized: an MNGS could be a social network that provided police and judicial service to its members, who might be as geographically separated as proved economically efficient. It doesn’t seem as if having a territory is necessary for an MNGS to keep the peace: what matters is that it be clear which MNGS is responsible for resolving a particular dispute, something that can clearly be determined by the right sorts of agreements.
VIII. So we can imagine what seems to be a smooth conceptual transition from (1) the kind of large-scale state Hobbes himself doubtless had in mind to (2) an MNGS featuring unfettered emigration and largely unfettered immgration to (3) such an MNGS without compulsory funding to (4) such an MNGS without territory.
IX. It seems, then, that endorsing the Hobbesian argument for the state is consistent with endorsing market anarchy. Or, put another way, a voluntary protective agency could qualify as a Hobbesian Leviathan.
X. Clearly, this isn’t a conclusion the Hobbesian is likely to want to endorse. At what point along the continuum do you think she is likely to maintain that the MNGS would no longer be able to do the work Leviathan is supposed to do? And how would you respond?
I. It is important to note how little this argument even seeks, on its own terms, to demonstrate: if it succeeds, it shows the need, at most, for a “night-watchman” or “night-guard” state.
II. It has limited implications for the size of the state. Again, assuming the argument were correct, there would obviously be some such limitations: the population governed by Leviathan would have to be sufficiently large that
- the people with whom one were most likely to have disputes would also fall within Leviathan’s jurisdiction
- relevant economies of scale could come into play
- Leviathan was sufficiently well funded to enable it to repel invasions by other states
IV. Nothing about the basic functions of Leviathan precludes free departure from any of these MNGSs (presuming agreements across borders ensure that courts’ judgments could still be enforced against people who fleeing to avoid the enforcement of such judgments).
V. There would be no Hobbesian reason for general limitations on anyone's entry into any of these MNGSs, with the exception of someone with a history of violence that suggested that the MNGS would have more trouble keeping the peace were she to enter (and, even here, entry need not be precluded for a potentially violent person willing to post an appropriate bond).
VI. There would, again, be no strong Hobbesian reason for any MNGS to compel payment for its services by any resident. It could simply decline to provide direct protection via its police and judicial services for anyone who declined to contribute appropriately to support for these services. Of course, some people would reap positive externalities in this case, but it seems unlikely that most would because most would want personal access to police and judicial services.
VII. Finally, it is not clear that there would be a strong Hobbesian reason for an MNGS to be geographically localized: an MNGS could be a social network that provided police and judicial service to its members, who might be as geographically separated as proved economically efficient. It doesn’t seem as if having a territory is necessary for an MNGS to keep the peace: what matters is that it be clear which MNGS is responsible for resolving a particular dispute, something that can clearly be determined by the right sorts of agreements.
VIII. So we can imagine what seems to be a smooth conceptual transition from (1) the kind of large-scale state Hobbes himself doubtless had in mind to (2) an MNGS featuring unfettered emigration and largely unfettered immgration to (3) such an MNGS without compulsory funding to (4) such an MNGS without territory.
IX. It seems, then, that endorsing the Hobbesian argument for the state is consistent with endorsing market anarchy. Or, put another way, a voluntary protective agency could qualify as a Hobbesian Leviathan.
X. Clearly, this isn’t a conclusion the Hobbesian is likely to want to endorse. At what point along the continuum do you think she is likely to maintain that the MNGS would no longer be able to do the work Leviathan is supposed to do? And how would you respond?
Comments
I'm with you that MNGSs would provide internal peace better than classic Leviathan. But why would MNGSs interact more--or equally--peacefully with other MNGSs than big states with other big states?
It seems to me that whatever we think of this account, it at least isn't clearly compatible with some of the clauses in your post. If we're subordinating our private reasons to The State's public reason, then it seems like we would want to recognize some pretty significant constraints on our ability to question the state's policies and structure. Something like the Lockean story in ch. 11 of the Second Treatise, where a government loses its legitimate authority by failing to carry out the tasks which are the purpose of its existence, would fit the bill: insofar as a government fails to be an adequate source of public reason, the Hobbesian may support some sort of action. But it seems to me that so long as The State fulfills its role as source of public reason, the Hobbesian is going to be hard-pressed to impose too many further limits on it.
I'm no expert on Hobbes, though, and as I've articulated it I don't think the Hobbesian position can stand up to scrutiny. So if you have any insight as to what's wrong with my interpretation, that would be greatly appreciated!
I have no reason to think that a MNGS would be more peaceful than a current state, but I can't imagine why it would be less peaceful, for the usual reasons: (a) the costs of violence and (b) the internalization of norms enjoining fairness, cooperation, etc. In addition, a genuinely minimal (“night-guard”) state would have limited capacity to develop the kind of military force needed for offensive action, since it would either (as in step VI) have no tax system at all or else would, at most, have the kind of tax system needed to maintain police and court services.
The trend has been more and more countries. The faster that trend moves, the fewer wars, the less genocide.
Danny: your comments are insightful and helpful. I guess I wonder if you could elaborate a bit on the point at which the entities on which my story focuses couldn't provide the relevant sorts of public reasons.
There is:
the people with whom one were most likely to have disputes would also fall within Leviathan’s jurisdiction
My response to a Hobessian would be that I don't accept this.
If we follow Hobbes as far as he wants to go in subordinating our will to the will of the sovereign, I can't see how we could get to the limited night-watchman state (or really any other limited state). I mean, I don't think Hobbes is right about all of this. But it seems to me that putting limits on the state's domain of authority is going to force Hobbes to pull back from his core argument: that avoiding conflict and the state of war requires us to completely submit to public reason as defined by the sovereign.
If I understand you correctly, you'd suggest that the Hobbesian gets off the bus at the beginning of the argument, the point at which I maintain that, with its focus on the state as a means of preventing "the war of all against all," the argument justifies only a night-watchman state, since so many of the things the state does have nothing to do with civil peace and so admit of no Hobbesian justification. Your response, if I understand correctly, is that the Hobbesian will want to say that the kind of entity actually capable of preserving civil peace will be unlimited, that a limited entity couldn't actually succeed in achieving the goal Hobbes wants it to achieve, so that, even though, say, regulating people's peaceful sexual behavior is no part of maintaining civil peace, a state that couldn't regulate other people's sexual behavior wouldn't be properly equipped to maintain civil peace.
Now, I think it's worth noting that, even if one were to accept this much from the Hobbesian, I think she would still confront some of the continuum problem I pose here. That is, zillions (that's a technical term) of micro-states could likely perform the needed trick as well as large ones, one might be able, even on Hobbes's own terms, to make some of the other needed moves--allowing free immigration and emigration and making Leviathan non-territorial.
Maybe. But maybe not. Clearly, an absolute sovereign could prohibit free movement and insist on territorial control. So I think the real question here is whether the Hobbesian is right that civil peace requires an authority with an unlimited mandate. Hobbes may well have thought so; but I think I'd want to maintain that, if your responsibility is preserving civil peace, you largely need the authority required to preserve civil peace, not the authority to do just anything. I emphasize, I don't intend that as a rebuttal of anything you've said, but just a sketch of my likely response to Hobbes; the more reasonable neo-Hobbesian argument I envision at the beginning of this post is still, I think, subject to the objection I've leveled here that one doesn't really need a state to do what the argument supposes we need done.