Hyper-Minimal States vs. Protective Agencies
So, consider this a continuation of the conversation I began a few months ago about the “state-anarchy continuum.”
Begin with what I'll call a “hyper-minimal state.”
The interesting question, I think, is, In what does this putative's state's identify as a state consist?
It's not in the limitation on the right to secede. After all, if there were nothing that qualified on other grounds as a state in operation in a given territory, it's not clear what secession would mean: there would be nothing from which to secede.
So: is this putative state a state? Would it qualify as a Randian “final arbiter”? Is it ultimately different from a protective agency and, if so, how?
I have some instincts about this, but before articulating them I'd like to know how readers react.
Begin with what I'll call a “hyper-minimal state.”
- It claims a continguous territory, but the territory for which it is responsible is very small: perhaps between 50 and 2,000 sq. km.
- There are no restrictions on emigration or immigration.
- Anyone whose property is contiguous with the border may secede at will.
- The state performs only two functions: it operates a police force and a court system, with the latter responsible only for resolving property, tort, and contract disputes.
- One of the state's courts will hear a case regarding a property, tort, or contract dispute only when the parties have already obtained a decision from a private arbitration/conciliation/mediation entity regarding the dispute and wish to appeal it.
- The only role of any of the state's courts with respect to an appeal from a private entity's decision regarding a dispute is to determine whether the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the entity, intended that it be final, and received a clear decision from the entity consistent with the substantive and procedural rules regarding which the parties agreed when entering the dispute.
- The only role of the state's police agency will be to prevent or end the use of force associated with the attempt to resist a judgment by a private arbitrator/mediator/conciliator or to protect someone's person or property against an attack not carried out under the color of law.
- There is no system of taxation. The police force and the court system are operated using a combination of user fees, donations, and volunteer work.
- There are private for-profit, not-for-profit, and volunteer security providers with whose operation the state ordinarily does not interfere.
The interesting question, I think, is, In what does this putative's state's identify as a state consist?
It's not in the limitation on the right to secede. After all, if there were nothing that qualified on other grounds as a state in operation in a given territory, it's not clear what secession would mean: there would be nothing from which to secede.
So: is this putative state a state? Would it qualify as a Randian “final arbiter”? Is it ultimately different from a protective agency and, if so, how?
I have some instincts about this, but before articulating them I'd like to know how readers react.
Comments
So, on to details: I don't envision the state as using its police force to require people to use its courts, so any entrepreneur or not-for-profit entity that wanted to create an appeals court would be free to do so. No monopoly there, I think.
In this hypo, the HMS doesn't own any land, let's say: the court system and the police agency both use land rented at market rates from individuals or groups who (we may assume) own it legitimately.
The HMS doesn't deal directly with deeds: these are handled by private owners. The question, here, I think, though, is, What does it say that an HMS thus described has jurisdiction? (BTW, can you say more about your skepticism about permanent restrctive covenants?)
I think your point about a fact-sensitive inquiry about the HMS's circumstances is entirely appropriate. I had in mind--just to make the hypo difficult--a situation in which the region in which it operates was filled with other, similarly sized HMS's, all characterized by ease of entry and exit.
Let's say, though, that, because of external circumstances, exit did prove difficult. Given that people don't have to use the entity's court system at all, is there anything else it could do that would make it a hyper-minimal state, rather than an entity I've just referred to as a state in my never-ending quest to cause trouble?
About permanent restrictive covenants: I think restrictions on use are alright when they're demanded by the seller and agreed to by the buyer. From what I read, though, restrictive covenants are made by the developers. Since the covenants "run with the land", current residents can be bound by the preferences of people from generations ago, and that just seems counter-intuitive to me.
That said, I don't like restrictive covenants either. As you'll see from my earlier post on HOAs, they give me the creeps.
Is there any sense in which the HMS thus described could claim to exercise a monopoly of force in "its" territory?
However, as a means of bridging the gap between anarchist and minarchist thinking, I don't think it will do the trick. At least not for all minarchists.
For some, the existence of the state is a safeguard mechanism, and thus if you had a 'state' that could be relegated to obscurity and irrelevance entirely (as it seems your model could), it wouldn't provide sufficient assurance to the populace that "anything goes" (as many view anarchy) would ever occur, and this would lead inexorably to rioting, mass cannibalism, dogs living with cats, etc.
I think that those minarchists who see the necessity of the state so clearly would insist on at least a minimal tax. Otherwise, it might be impossible to maintain itself, even if it got the occasional customer. (Imagine the US Post Office surviving without its legal monopoly. It's bankrupt as it is, and would probably completely disappear without constant protection and subsidy.)
It seems to me that the potential for abuse vis-a-vis the latter would be among the more obvious challenges to the reasonableness of a remedial state. But I like Hasnas's idea that the establishment of such a state would provide a simple way of testing the claims made by Cowen and others about the viability of anarchy.
I'm sure there are still issues to be sorted out here. One of them that occurred to me as I was gloating over your comments: what if you and I have a dispute in a private court; if I appeal and you don't consent to the appeal, what gives the HMS court's judgment any validity? Can it force you to accept the judgment? (This is a different question from the earlier one--viz., can the HMS put competitor appellate courts out of business?). If the answer is "no," should the HMS operate a court system at all? If the answer is "yes," it seems as if the HMS really is (gag) a state.
Incorrect. Note that PDAs *may* use violence to force an unconsenting party to accept a judgment. Using force on unconsenting parties is not necessarily a definitive property the state. Therefore, answering 'yes' to your question does not mean that the HMS is really a state. Of course us market-anarchists argue that force would hopefully be used rarely, since PDAs are concerned about their public reputation, customer satisfaction, cost of enforcement, profit, third party appeals, etc., and would thus avoid doing so except as a last resort.
Another reason that such a HMS is not a state is that the HMS as you describe cannot defacto (dejure is a different story) prohibit other competing HMSs/PDAs from responding to the first HMS's use of force and successfully intervening on behalf of the unconsenting party. Such a situation is entirely possible and permissible under market-anarchy.
If the answer to your question is 'no', then such a HMS is simply an private court service which simply offers legal services (in the form of layers, detectives, investigators, scientists, ballistics experts, pathologists, criminal psychologists, etc.) on a voluntary basis. Again, the existence of such a legal firm is entirely permissible in a market-anarchist society.
Regarding the "validity" of *the* HMS ruling, ultimately at the end of the day, someone or some PDA might use violence against an unconsenting party. Is is "valid"? Is their such a thing as objective "validity" of HMS court rulings? I would argue that your question on the "validity" is irrelevant to the discussion of HMS vs Minarchism. Ultimately there are many people living in society, each with different knowledge, life experiences, interpretations and observations of reality, and varying threshrolds with which to apply the Non-Aggression Principle. Is one person's or PDA's or HMS's ruling more "valid" than another?
Note that market-anarchism is not a utopian world where force is never used against unconsenting parties. However, anarchists like myself do claim that it is a far superior social structure than our current statist prisons, and that by applying the Non-Aggression principle as both the means and the ends, a market-anarchist society will minimize aggression.
Alternatively, it might be that stateless subscribers of WalCourt and other arbitration services are specifically excluded from coverage by WalCourt when in Her Majesty's State controlled areas.
By the way, does the HMS permit the establishment of another HMS in it's territory? It seems to me that it would, unless it forcibly prevents the conglomeration of various competing services.