A Simple Account of Rights
Here's what I'll call the Simple Account of a right: A moral subject, S , has a right against a moral agent, A , that A not engage in a specified course of conduct, C , provided that ( i ) it is wrong, all things considered, for A to engage in C and ( ii ) C constitutes ( a ) an all-things-considered harm to S , or ( b ) a failure to fulfill a duty owed by A to S . What makes the Simple Account simple is that it defines rights in terms of moral duties. Wherever there's a (perfect, in the Kantian sense) duty , there's a right that the duty be fulfilled. I offer the Simple Account as a deliberate alternative to accounts of rights in accordance with which a right is a moral claim that can be backed up by means of force (however defined). Tendentiously, I'll refer to these as Narrow Accounts. I think the distinction between the rights-violations that can and the rights-violations that cannot be remedied using force is important, and I do not mean to trivialize...